A cooperative game with transferable utility {or simply a TU-game{ describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payo®s by cooperation. A value function for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payo®s over the players in the game. An alternative type of solutions are share functions which assign to every player in a TU-game its share in the payo®s to be distributed.
Introduction
A situation in which a¯nite set of n players can obtain certain payo®s by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility {or simply a TUgame{ being a pair (N; v), where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a¯nite set of players and v: 2 N ! R is a characteristic function on N such that v(;) = 0. In this paper we consider monotone TU-games, i.e. games (N; v) satisfying v(E) v(F ) if E ½ F ½ N . We denote the collection of all monotone TU-games by G. A monotone game (N; v) is a null game if v(E) = 0 for all E ½ N . We denote the null game on player set N by (N; v 0 ), and we denote the class of monotone games that are not null games by G + .
A value function on G is a function f that assigns to every (N; v) 2 G an jN j-dimensional real vector f (N; v) 2 R jN j representing a distribution of payo®s among the players. A value function f is e±cient on G if for every game in G it exactly distributes the worth v(N ) of the`grand coalition' over all players, i.e. if (Shapley (1953) ). An example of a value function that is not e±cient is the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf (1965) , Owen (1975) , Dubey and Shapley (1979) ). Since the Banzhaf value is not e±cient it is not adequate in allocating the worth v(N ). In order to allocate v(N ) according to the Banzhaf value, van den Brink and van der Laan (1998) characterized the normalized Banzhaf value which distributes the worth v(N ) proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players.
An alternative approach to e±ciently allocating the worth v(N ) is using share functions as introduced in van der Laan and van den . A share vector for game (N; v) 2 G is an jN j-dimensional real vector x 2 R jN j such that P i2N x i = 1. Here x i is player i's share in the total payo® that is to be distributed among the players. A share function on G is a function that assigns to every (N; v) 2 G exactly one share vector 1 ½(N; v) 2 fx 2 R jN j j P i2N x i = 1g. The share function corresponding to the Shapley value is the Shapley share function which is obtained by dividing the Shapley value of each player by the sum of the Shapley values of all players (i.e. by v(N )). Similarly, the Banzhaf share function is obtained by dividing the Banzhaf-or normalized Banzhaf value by the corresponding sum of payo®s over all players. Note that, although the Banzhaf-and normalized Banzhaf value are very di®erent (for example, the Banzhaf value satis¯es linearity and the dummy player property which are not satis¯ed by the normalized Banzhaf value), they correspond to the same Banzhaf share function.
Share functions yield a distribution of the worth of the grand coalition re°ecting the individual bargaining position of the players. In this paper we consider situations in which the grand coalition forms in order to maximize the total payo®, but in which the players are also organized into smaller coalitions. These coalitions form a coalition structure being a¯nite partition P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g of the player set N and are assumed to be given exogenously. As motivated by Winter (1989) , the coalitions can be seen as pressure groups for the division of v(N ). So, to divide the worth of the grand coalition over all players,¯rst this worth is distributed over the coalitions in the a priori given coalition structure, and then the payo® assigned to a coalition is distributed over all its players. For games in a priori given coalition structure P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g of m coalitions several value functions have been proposed in the literature. The Aumann-Drµ eze value assigns to any player in a coalition P k 2 P the Shapley value of the restriction { 3 { of the game (N; v) to coalition P k , see Aumann and Drµ eze (1974) . Under this value concept, the total payo® of the players within a coalition P k is equal to the worth of this coalition and therefore the total payo® is equal to P m k=1 v(P k ), which need not to be equal to v(N ). According to the Aumann-Drµ eze value, the payo® of a player i in some coalition P k does not depend upon its contribution to any coalition containing players outside P k . In fact, it is supposed that the grand coalition is not formed but that the players agree to disagree and are satis¯ed with cooperation within the coalitions P k , k = 1; : : : ; m. However, one can imagine many situations in which players form coalitions within the grand coalition. As already argued by Aumann and Drµ eze (1974) , in many of such situations it is very reasonable that also the outside opportunities of the members of a coalition have to be taken into account. According to e.g. Hart and Kurz (1983) the existence of a coalition structure implies a two-level interaction between the players. Firstly, the worth of the grand coalition is distributed amongst the coalitions; secondly the payo® to each coalition is distributed amongst the players within this coalition. The outcome of such a two-level interaction is re°ected by the so-called coalition structure value introduced by Owen (1977) . The Owen coalition structure (CS-)value has the property that the total payo® of the players in a coalition P k is equal to the Shapley value of the coalition P k , when this coalition is considered to be a player in the¯rst level game between the coalitions. As a consequence we have that the Owen CS-value can be considered as a generalization of the Shapley value to games in coalition structure.
The Owen CS-share function is obtained by dividing the Owen CS-value by the worth v(N ) of the grand coalition (being equal to the sum of the Owen CS-values of all players). The Owen CS-share function alternatively can be de¯ned using the following multiplication property. The Owen CS-share of player i 2 P k 2 P in the worth to be distributed is equal to the product of the Shapley share of coalition P k in the¯rst level external game between the coalitions and the Shapley share of player i in an appropriately de¯ned second level internal game between the players in P k . In the same way van der Laan and van den Brink (1999) de¯ne the Banzhaf CS-share function which assigns to player i 2 P k the product of the Banzhaf share of coalition P k in the¯rst level (external) game between coalitions and the Banzhaf share of player i in an appropriately de¯ned second level (internal) game.
In this paper we de¯ne a general class of CS-share functions using this multiplication property. All these CS-share functions satisfy the consistency property stating { 4 { that the share of a coalition in the external game between a priori coalitions is equal to the sum of the shares of the players in this coalition in the original game in coalition structure. Moreover, we provide axiomatic characterizations of this class of CS-share functions using the multiplication and consistency properties. This class of CS-share functions generalizes the Owen CS-share function and the Banzhaf CS-share function.
This Banzhaf CS-share function is not the same as the Banzhaf type CS-share function corresponding to the Banzhaf CS-value function introduced by Owen (1981) for games in coalition structure. In particular the share function obtained from Owen's Banzhaf CS-value function does neither satisfy the multiplication nor the consistency property.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some preliminaries on share functions and games in coalition structure. In Section 3 we introduce a class of share functions for games in coalition structure. In Section 4 we provide an axiomatic characterization of this class using the multiplication property. In Section 5 we characterize this class using consistency. Finally, we make some concluding remarks in Section 6.
Preliminaries
First, for player set N and set T ½ N , the game (N; u T ) denotes the unanimity game B on the class G of monotone games are the functions de¯ned by have been given by e.g. Lehrer (1988) , Haller (1994) , Nowak (1997) and Grabisch and Roubens (1999) . Since the Banzhaf value is not e±cient, this value is not adequate in allocating the worth v(N ) of the`grand coalition'. To divide the worth v(N ) according to the Banzhaf value on the class of monotone non-null games van den Brink and van der 
and ' An alternative approach to e±ciently divide the worth of the grand coalition amongst its players is given by the concept of share function introduced by van der Laan and van den . A share function assigns to each player in a game its share in the worth to be distributed, i.e. a share function on a subclass C ½ G of monotone games is a function ½ on C satisfying
The Banzhaf share function ½ B on G + is given by
We now state the following properties for share functions. First, a share function ½ satis¯es the null player property on C ½ G if for every (N; v) 2 C and every null player and (E n fjg;
The following two results follow from van der Laan and van den , see also van den Brink and van der Laan (1999a). In case the ¹-function is a weighted sum of the marginal contributions of the players (with equal positive weights assigned to coalitions of equal size), then the corresponding share function is given in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.2 For given positive vectors
Then the unique share function satisfying the null player property, symmetry, and ¹ ! -additivity on G + is given by
Note that for any system of positive weights the corresponding function ¹ ! is positive, symmetric and additive on G + and thus satis¯es the conditions of Theorem 2.1. In case the weight system ! n is given by
; t = 1; : : : ; n, n 2 IN, we denote ¹ S = ¹ e ! and we have that
In van der Laan and van den it is shown that the unique share function satisfying the properties stated in Theorem 2.2 with ¹ ! = ¹ S is the Shapley share function ½ S , and the unique share function satisfying these properties with
Games in coalition structure
The share functions de¯ned in the previous section yield a distribution of the worth of the grand coalition re°ecting the individual bargaining position of the players.
In many situations however, it is reasonable to suppose that players form coalitions which decide to act together against the other players in bargaining over v(N ). In this section we consider situations in which the players are organized in a priori given coalition structure.
A coalition structure on a player set N is a¯nite partition P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g of m non-empty, disjoint subsets of N , i.e. [ m k=1 P k = N and P k \ P`= ; for all k;`2 f1; : : : ; mg, k 6 =`. In the following the set of coalitions in the coalition { 8 { structure P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g is denoted by M = f1; : : : ; mg with k 2 M representing coalition P k 2 P . Furthermore, a monotone game (N; v) 2 G in coalition structure P is denoted by (N; v; P ). The collection of all coalition structures on N is denoted by P N . The collection of all monotone games in coalition structure is denoted by GP. A coalition structure (CS-)value function µ on the set GP assigns a payo® to any player in every monotone game in coalition structure (N; v; P ). Hart and Kurz (1983) argue that the existence of a coalition structure implies a two-level interaction between the players. The outcome of such a two-level interaction is re°ected by the Owen Coalition Structure value (Owen CS-value) µ S introduced by Owen (1977) , which is de¯ned by
where P (L) = [ j2L P j . We remark that the Owen CS-value reduces to the Shapley value when P = fN g or when P = ffig i2N g. The weights of the marginal values are a product of two`Shapley weights', re°ecting the fact that¯rst coalitions enter subsequently in a random order and that within each coalition the players enter subsequently in a random order. For given (N; v; P ) 2 GP, with P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g, the m-player¯rst-level or external game between coalitions is the game (M; v P ) 2 G de¯ned by M = f1; :::; mg as the set of players and characteristic function v P given by
This game is already introduced by Owen (1977) who calles it the quotient game.
For all k 2 M , it follows from equation (1) by summing up over all i 2 P k that
showing that the sum of the payo®s to the players in P k is equal to the Shapley value of player k (representing coalition P k ) in the external game between the coalitions. Since this property generalizes the fact that the Owen CS-value reduces to the Shapley value when P = fN g or when P = ffig i2N g, as mentioned already above, we say that the Owen CS-value is consistent. Since by e±ciency of the Shapley value A CS-share function is a function Ã on GP satisfying P i2N Ã i (N; v; P ) = 1 for all (N; v; P ) 2 GP and assigns to every player in a monotone game in coalition structure a share in the worth v(N ) to be distributed. The Owen CS-share function assigns to every player in a monotone game in coalition structure its share according to the Owen CS-value, i.e. it is the function Ã S given by
The Owen CS-share of player i 2 P k 2 P can be reformulated as the product of two Shapley shares. The¯rst share is the share ½ S k (M; v P ) of coalition k in the m-player rst-level external game (M; v P ) between coalitions that is discussed before. The second share is the share
where, for
is the marginal contribution of E ½ P k to the union P (L) of the coalitions P j ; j 2 L.
So, the internal game ( assigned to coalition k 2 M if this coalition joins the collection L ½ M of coalitions. For given (N; v; P ) 2 GP with P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g and M = f1; :::; mg van der Laan and van den Brink (1999) 
Van der Laan and van den Brink (1999) use this multiplication property to de¯ne a Banzhaf-type coalition structure share function. To do so they replace in equation (3) 5 Owen (1977) shows a similar property without using the concept of share function.
{ 10 { the second-level Shapley weights by the corresponding second-level Banzhaf weights
Applying a similar multiplication property as (5) they de¯ne the Banzhaf Coalition Structure (CS-)share function as the function Ã B on GP given by
This Banzhaf CS-share function is di®erent from the CS-share function that is obtained by normalizing the Banzhaf-type CS-value function that is introduced in Owen (1981) (see also Section 6).
3 A class of CS-share functions for games in coalition structure
In this section we generalize the share functions ½ ¹ discussed in Section 2.1 to games in coalition structure. The share functions ½ ¹ are de¯ned on the class G + of monotone non-null games. For null games the concept of share function is in itself not very interesting, because in such a game it seems reasonable that any player gets a payo® of zero irrespective of the shares. Moreover, in many applications we may restrict ourselves to the class G + of monotone non-null games. However, in this paper we apply the concept of share functions to games in coalition structure. As argued before, for such games the payo® of a player can be seen as the result of a¯rst-level external game between coalitions and a second-level internal game between the players within a coalition. In such a set-up we have to deal with null games, which may appear on the second (internal) level, even when the game itself is a non-null game. Therefore we extend the concept of share functions to null games by giving all players an equal share, i.e.
We can generalize Theorem 2.1 to the class G of all monotone games in a straightforward way by requiring symmetry and ¹-additivity to hold for all games in G, and { 11 { requiring the null player property only for the non-null games 6 in G + .
We generalize the share functions ½ ¹ to games in coalition structure using the multiplication property that de¯nes the share for player i 2 P k in game (N; v) in coalition structure P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g, as the product of the share of coalition k in the external game (M; v P ) in which the coalitions in P act as individual players, and the share of player i in some internal game among the players in P k . To do so, for given positive, additive and symmetric function ¹: G ! R, game (N; v) 2 G and coalition structure P 2 P N , we de¯ne for P k 2 P the ¹-internal game (P k ; v
where M = f1; : : : ; mg and the game (M; v P P k jE ) on the player set M of coalitions is given by the characteristic function v P P k jE ; E ½ P k 2 P , de¯ned by
So, the characteristic function v P P k jE assigns to every coalition L of coalitions in the coalition structure the worth of the union of these coalitions where coalition P k is replaced by E ½ P k , i.e. player l 2 M nfkg represents a priori coalition P l 6 = P k in the coalition structure P , whereas player k represents the subcoalition E of P k instead of P k as a whole. Notice that this game also appears in Owen (1977) , re°ecting in some sense coalition's E ½ P k possibilities if it defects from P k .
Given a positive, additive and symmetric function ¹: G ! R, in the next theorem we introduce a function Ã ¹ on G using the multiplication property with respect to the external game (M; v P ) and the internal game (P k ; v P k ¹ ) and show that this function is a share function satisfying a set of consistency properties. 
for i 2 P k 2 P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g 2 P N ; k 2 M = f1; : : : ; mg, is a CS-share function and satis¯es for every (N; v; P ) 2 GP the following consistency properties:
and thus Ã ¹ is indeed a CS-share function. It further follows that 1.
2. For P = fP 1 g with P 1 = N , and M = f1g it follows with equation (8) that ; ffig i2N g ). These two consistency properties also imply that property 1 can be written as 
according to Theorem 3.1 the function Ã ¹ S is given by Ã
see van der Laan and van den
Brink (1998)), it is su±cient to show that the internal game (P k ; v P k ) as given in equation (3) is equal to the internal game (P k ; v
Analogously, for the Banzhaf CS-share function we can show that the internal game (P k ; b v P k ) as given in equation (6) is equal to the internal game (P k ; v
Other CS-share functions are obtained by taking other ¹-functions. For instance, consider the non-e±cient Deegan-Packel value given by ' , t = n ¡ 1; : : : ; 1. Applying this solution to games in coalition structure as de¯ned in Theorem 3.1 gives the CS-share function Ã ¹ DP given by
In the next example we evaluate the Owen CS-share function, the Banzhaf CS-share function and this ¹ DP CS-share function for a four player game with a three coalition structure. 
For coalition structure P = fP 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 g with P 1 = f1; 2g, P 2 = f3g and P 3 = f4g, the external game (M; v P ) with M = f1; 2; 3g is given by v P (S) = 1 if 1 2 S and
Since the Shapley-, Banzhaf-and ¹ DP -shares of the coalitions f3g and f4g in the external game are zero, it follows that the Shapley-, Banzhaf-, and ¹ DP -CS-shares of players 3 and 4 are equal to 0. So, we are left to determine the CS-shares for players 1 and 2. Using for L ½ f2; 3g ½ M the marginal contributions v P 1 ;L (E), E ½ P 1 , (see equation (4)) as given in Table 1 , and the weight vectors e ! 3 = ( ; 0; 0) > , Ã B (N; v; P ) = ( In this section we provide an axiomatization of the CS-share functions de¯ned in Theorem 3.1 using the multiplication property. So, for ¹ a symmetric, additive and positive function on G, we state several axioms for a share function Ã on GP. Since we want to axiomatically characterize CS-share functions for games in coalition structure we state all axioms in terms of CS-shares functions.
In the next axiom it is required that a share function satis¯es the multiplication property. Since in this property the internal game v P k ¹ appears and this game depends on the chosen ¹-function, the multiplication property also depends on this ¹-function.
Axiom 4.1 (¹-Multiplication) For ¹: G ! R, (N; v; P ) 2 GP and i 2 P k 2 P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g it holds that
The null player property is a straightforward generalization of the null player property for share functions. Note that the null player property only requires that null players in monotone nonnull games earn a zero payo®. As done in Winter (1989 Winter ( , 1992 for CS-value functions, we distinguish two symmetry axioms for CS-share functions: an individual and a coalitional symmetry axiom. The individual symmetry axiom states that players who belong to the same a priori coalition and are symmetric in the game earn the same share in the payo®. (Coalitional symmetry is introduced after the next theorem.)
In property 2 of Theorem 3.1 we saw that the CS-share function Ã ¹ generalizes the share functions ½ ¹ by taking coalition structure P = fN g. In Section 2 we already mentioned that the share functions ½ ¹ satisfy ¹-additivity. Next we restate ¹-additivity for games in coalition structure in terms of CS-share functions. The next theorem proves that the CS-share function Ã ¹ given in Theorem 3.1 is the unique CS-share functions satisfying the four axioms stated above.
Theorem 4.5 Let ¹: G ! R be positive, additive and symmetric on G. Then Ã ¹ is the unique CS-share function on G that satis¯es ¹-multiplication, the null player property, individual symmetry and ¹-additivity for one-coalition structures.
Proof
The property of ¹-multiplication of Ã ¹ follows directly from the de¯nition of Ã ¹ and consistency property 2 in Theorem 3.1. Next, let i 2 P k 2 P 2 P N be a null
Since ½ ¹ satis¯es the null player property we have that Finally, for arbitrary (N; v; P ) 2 GP, uniqueness of Ã(N; v; P ) then follows directly from applying ¹-multiplication.
Q.E.D.
Instead of the coalition structure fN g in ¹-additivity for one-coalition structures we could also require ¹-additivity just for coalition structures with jN j coalitions, i.e. the coalition structures ffig i2N g. In order to characterize the class of share functions Ã ¹ using this ¹-additivity of jN jcoalition structures we need to replace individual symmetry by coalitional symmetry stating that the total payo®s for two coalitions that are symmetric in the external game (M; v P ) are the same.
Axiom 4.7 (Coalitional symmetry) If P k ; P l 2 P 2 P N are symmetric players in the external game (M; v P ) induced by (N; v; P ) 2 GP, then
Theorem 4.8 Let ¹: G ! R be positive, additive and symmetric on G. Then the function Ã ¹ is the unique CS-share function on G that satis¯es ¹-multiplication, the null player property, coalitional symmetry and ¹-additivity for jN j-coalition structures.
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Proof From Theorem 4.5 it directly follows that Ã ¹ satis¯es ¹-multiplication and the null player property. If P k ; P l 2 P are symmetric players in (M; v P ) then symmetry of ½ ¹ , and ½ ¹ being a share function imply that 
An axiomatization using consistency
In Section 3 we de¯ned for given function ¹ the CS-share function Ã ¹ by using the multiplication property and showed that this function satis¯es three consistency properties. In the previous section we characterized this class of share functions using the multiplication property as one of the axioms. Next we give an axiomatization of the CS-share functions Ã ¹ that uses consistency property 1. As in the previous section, we state the axioms in terms of CS-shares functions. So, in the following axioms, let ¹ be a symmetric, additive and positive function on G and Ã a CS-share function on GP.
Axiom 5.1 (Consistency) If (N; v; P ) 2 GP and P k 2 P then
Unlike ¹-multiplication this axiom does not depend on the ¹-function. Finally, we generalize ¹-additivity for one-coalition structures (and ¹-additivity for n-coalition structures).
Axiom 5.2 (¹-additivity for coalition structures) For (N; v; P ); (N; w; P ) 2 GP let the characteristic function z be given by z = v + w. For i 2 P k 2 P it holds that
When in Theorem 4.5 the axiom of ¹-multiplication is replaced by consistency and the axiom of ¹-additivity for one-coalition structures is strengthened to ¹-additivity for coalition structures we again obtain a characterization for the CS-share functions Ã ¹ as de¯ned in Theorem 3.1. ¹-additivity for coalition structures follows since z = v 0 also implies that z P and z
are null games for all P k 2 P . Next, suppose that (N; z) 2 G + , and let i 2 P k 2 P be a null player in (N; z). Then i also is a null player in both (N; v) and (N; w), because both games are monotone games. Using similar arguments as when proving the null player property in the proof of Theorem 4.5 it follows that Ã ¹ i (N; z; P ) = 0. Further, ¹(P k ; v
So, also in this case ¹-additivity for coalition structures holds.
Finally, if i is not a null player in (N; z) 2 G + , then ¹(P k ; z
using ¹-additivity of ½ ¹ we can derive that
Consistency property 2 of Theorem 3.1 then implies that Ã ¹ also satis¯es ¹-additivity for coalition structures in this case.
To show uniqueness, suppose that Ã satis¯es the four axioms. For a null game, Ã(N; v 0 ; P ) is uniquely determined by individual symmetry. Next, consider for T ½ N , the scaled unanimity game (N; w T ), with w T = c T u T , c T > 0, and let P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P m g be a coalition structure in P N . For i 2 N n T the null player property implies that Ã i (N; w T ; P ) = 0. To obtain Ã i (N; w T ; P ) for i 2 T ,¯rst de¯ne K(T; P ) := fk 2 M j P k \T 6 = ;g. Then, all coalitions P k 2 P such that k 2 K(T; P ) are symmetric in the external game (M; (w T ) P ). Individual symmetry then implies that there exists a c ¤ 2 R such that Ã k (M; (w T ) P ; fM g) = c ¤ for all k 2 K(T; P ).
By Ã being a CS-share function and P i2P k Ã i (N; w T ; P ) = 0 for all k 2 M n K(T; P ), we have that Ã k (M; (w T ) P ; fM g) = c ¤ = 1 jK(T;P )j for all k 2 K(T; P ). Consistency then implies that P i2P k Ã i (N; w T ; P ) = 1 jK(T;P )j for k 2 K(T; P ). Since all i 2 P k \ T are symmetric players in (N; w T ), and Ã i (N; w T ; P ) = 0 for i 2 N n T , individual symmetry implies that Ã i (N; w T ; P ) = 1 jP k \T j¢jK(T;P )j for i 2 P k \ T and thus Ã(N; w T ; P ) is uniquely determined for any w T and coalition structure P . Finally for arbitrary (N; v) 2 G and coalition structure P , Ã(N; v + ; P ) and Ã(N; v ¡ ; P ) follow directly from ¹-additivity for coalition structures and consequently the uniqueness of Ã(N; v; P ) follows directly from applying ¹-additivity for coalition structures to
We can restate ¹-additivity for coalition structures using coalition structures ffig i2P k g and ffkg k2M g instead of coalition structures fP k g, respectively, fM g. To characterize the share functions Ã ¹ we then also have to replace individual symmetry by coalitional symmetry as done in going from Theorem 4.5 to Theorem 4.8. Finally, we can replace consistency in Theorem 5.3 by coalitional symmetry. That gives a characterization using both individual and coalitional symmetry.
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Conclusion
In this paper we discussed a general approach to de¯ning CS-share functions for games in coalition structure using a multiplication property. We showed that all these CSshare functions are consistent in the sense that the total payo® of all players in an a priori coalition is equal to the payo® of this coalition in the external game between the coalitions. We gave axiomatic characterizations using these multiplication and consistency properties. Two special cases are the Shapley-and Banzhaf CS-share functions. The Shapley CS-share function is obtained by normalizing the Owen CS-value function to one. However, the Banzhaf CS-share function discussed in this paper is di®erent from the Banzhaf type CS-share function that is obtained a la Owen (1981)'s Banzhaf CSvalue function. In the Banzhaf value each marginal contribution has an equal weight. Generalizing this to games in coalition structure, Owen (1981) assigns equal weights to each marginal contribution of a coalition within the coalition structure and within such a coalition to each marginal contribution of the players within that coalition. Replacing in equation (1) , is not the same as the Banzhaf CS-share function discussed in this paper. In particular, it does not satisfy the multiplication property nor consistency.
